




IQOXE accident (2020 - ES) recommendations for the future

Seveso facilities


- ☐ Catalonia: 160 Seveso facilities
 - 93 high threshold
 - 67 low threshold
- Tarragona petrochemical area: 39 Seveso facilities (24% CAT)
 - 29 high threshold (23 south area)
 - 10 low threshold (8 south area)

Other facilities in the emergency plan: 8






Tarragona petrochemical area






Tarragona petrochemical area





PLASEQTA 2020

Tarragona petrochemical area




IQOXE

- Dangerous substances
 - Ethylene oxide 1550 Tn
 - Propylene oxide 1450 Tn
- Activity
 - Ethylene oxide production
 - Ethylene oxide and propylene oxide derivatives



Image from www.igoxe.com





IQOXE accident: January 14th 2020

- Units substances
 - Explosion in a reactor: ethylene oxide (4 Tn) polymerization (20 Tn)
 Area totally destroyed. Debris shrapnel all around (outside plant)
 - Fire in a tank (domino effect) : propylene oxide (263 m3)
- 3 deaths:
 - 2 workers
 - 1 neighbour (inside building home 2,5 km far away)





































Image from www.telecinco.es









Difficulties in the response

- Identification / notification of accident
 - Problems
 - No installation notification
 - Proximity of several facilities
 - No contribution from other facilities
 - Consequences
 - No able to identify facility affected (due to detect trough our petrochemical video network)
 - No able to define scenario -> no able to define effects / impact
 - Late response



Difficulties in the response

- Identification of possible consequences / impact
 - Problems
 - Scenario not include in analysis (but similar)
 - No fragment projection references (not included in ES analysis)
 - Proximity of citizens (neighbourhoods, sports areas, ...)
 - Consequences
 - Difficulties to connect impact 2,5 km far away (1 death) and fragments all around. Miss understanding scenario
 - Potential dramatically higher effects (vulnerable < 500 m)



Difficulties in the response

- Sheltering warnings sirens
 - Actions decisions
 - No toxic scenario (ethylene oxide burned polymerized)
 - No activation of warnings sirens
 - Recommend to stay inside for areas affected by smoke and vulnerable
 - Consequences
 - Local authorities claim sheltering
 - Activation and reverse decisions
 - Citizens assumed no control of the emergency (no risk control)



Recommendations for the future: response

- Preventive strategy
 - Sheltering for explosion scenarios (not just toxic clouds)
 - Sheltering automatically from the beginning in potential major accidents
 Warning sirens activation
- Improve anticipation
 - No dependence from the installations (failure scenarios)
 - Chemical sensor networks in the industrial urban interface



Recommendations for the future: prevention

- Risk Analysis: include
 - Fragment projection
 - Low probability scenarios / high impact
- Prevention urban control
 - Security area for chemical areas (UE standard; minimum value; 500 m is not enough for protection against extreme scenarios)
 - No vicinity with vulnerable activities (schools)
- Trustful information
 - Accidents may occur. Safety is never total

